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GUOMINDANG AND CCP POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES DURING THE PERIOD OF THE MARSHALL MEDIATION
The 1946 mission to China of U.S. Special Envoy General George C. Marshall is a rather well-studied topic in Chinese academic circles. However, a review of the Chinese scholarly literature reveals that relatively little attention has been paid to the examination of Chinese political forces and, in particular, the attitudes and policies of the Guomindang and the CCP toward the United States compared to the effort that has gone into studying U.S. policy toward China during the period of Marshall_s mediation. (1) This article explores Guomindang and CCP policies toward the United States during Marshall_s mediation in 1946. It examines how the two parties assessed the impact of the United States on the GMD-CCP conflict after the war, the policies and objectives they initially set for themselves, the adjustment in their policies toward the U.S., and whether or not they ultimately achieved their objectives.
1. BACKGROUND: CHANGES IN GMD AND CCP POLICY TOWARD THE U.S.
Since the fragmentation of China at the beginning of the 20th century, the foreign policy of all Chinese political forces had one distinctive feature in common. This was their enlistment of international forces to help them cope with their domestic adversaries. Postwar GMD and CCP policy toward the U.S. was no exception. During the war, the United States secured a position of influence in China surpassing that of any other great power, and In the last phase of the war, the U.S. directly intervened in the GMD-CCP conflict. The result was that by the end of the war, the U.S. had become the main foreign policy problem for both parties. The difference between them was that Chiang Kai-shek hoped to use the military alliance he had formed with the U.S. during the war to get Washington to support his government in the postwar period even in the event that civil war broke out. By the end of the war, the CCP and the United States had already become antagonists. Yanan_s basic policy was to prevent to the greatest extent possible direct U.S. military involvement in GMD-CCP conflicts. The Nationalists and the Communists both exerted considerable effort in pursuing their objectives.
(1) Nationalist Policy toward the U.S.
The greatest problem the Nationalist government faced at the end of the war was how to reestablish its rule over all of China. This necessitated that it contend with the CCP over the right to accept the Japanese surrender and the chance to control large areas in East and North China that had been occupied by, or were encircled by, communist forces. It also included the question of recovering Northeast China from the Soviet Union. Nationalist armies had been gravely weakened during the war and were holed up in the remote Southwestern parts of the country. Therefore, Chiang Kai-shek wanted the Allied countries to recognize the Nationalist government as the only entity lawfully entitled to receive the Japanese surrender. In addition, he urgently needed the United States to transport his troops into the areas of East and North China occupied by the Japanese, to supply him with military assistance, and to strengthen the Nationalist army_s fighting capacity. In the first three months after the war ended, Chiang Kai-shek was successful. He received reliable, all-around assistance from the Truman government.
First, with Hurley_s assistance, the U.S. emphasized that the Nationalist government had a legitimate right to accept the Japanese surrender on Chinese territory. This put the CCP in a disadvantageous political position in contesting the right to accept Japan_s surrender. Second, U.S. forces in China transported large numbers of Nationalist troops to Central and East China to expedite their occupation of Japanese-controlled strategic points and transportation routes ahead of CCP forces. Third, the U.S. promised to continue supplying military assistance to the Nationalist armies. Fourth, and most provocative, after landing in North China, U.S. forces had the gall to employ Japanese and puppet troops as garrison forces to protect lines of communication on behalf of the Nationalist government. [2] U.S. support and assistance to the Nationalist government indicated that Hurley_s simultaneous effort to mediate between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong was both hypocritical and farcical. This was because at least after mid-October U.S. support and assistance was one of the main reasons for the increasingly bitter military clashes between the Nationalists and the Communists.
In late November, the Truman Administration began to reassess its China policy. This was primarily due to worsening Soviet-American relations. In Northeast China, the Soviet Army placed obstacles in the path of the Nationalist takeover effort, and actively supported the Communist attempt to control the region. This punctured the Nationalist strategic fantasy of _Recovering North China by military force, and recovering Northeast China by diplomacy._[3] The second reason was that GMD-CCP military clashes in North China were growing more serious daily. U.S. miltary clashes with CCP forces were also occurring from time to time. Even though these were on a small scale, a number of Americans officers and troops had suffered casualties or had been detained by the Communist forces. In a mid-November report to the U.S. government, General Wedemeyer rather accurately reflected the American outlook on the situation in China. He said that the Soviet-American _contest to achieve the dominant position in North and Northeast China has already begun._ The report pointed out the limits of the Chinese government_s strength. If it fails to achieve an agreement with the Chinese Communist, it will be unable to stabilize the situation in North China. If, at the same time, it cannot reach agreement with the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists, it will be even less able to control the Northeast.[4]
The Truman administration settled on a dual course of action: to coordinate its China policy with that of the Soviet Union, and to send General Marshall on a mission to China to mediate the Guomindang-CCP conflict. On December 15, 1945 President Truman issued a statement proclaiming the three principles underlying U.S. China policy. These were: (1) Recognition of the Nationalist government as the sole legal government in China; (2) Hope that the Guomindang and the CCP would end their military clashes, and organize a representative system of government with the help of American mediation; (3) Assumption by the U.S., Britain, and the Soviet Union of the duty of returning the Northeast to Chinese control.[5]
The change in U.S. China policy represented a serious assault on Chiang Kai-shek_s strategy. U.S. support and assistance was the foundation of Chiang_s strategy for seizing control of North and Northeast China. U.S. troops were even directly involved in helping the Nationalist forces defend the rail line between Tianjin and Shanhaiguan and reconstruct the line between Qinhuangdao and Shanhaiguan.[6] It was precisely Chiang Kai-shek_s dependence upon American aid that left him no choice but to alter his strategic plans. On November 15, Chiang sent a cable to Truman, expressing the hope that the United States would undertake more active measures in the Northeast.[7] But he elicited no additional promises from Truman. U.S. forces in China refused to transport any more Nationalist troops to the Northeast. Wedemeyer informed Chiang Kai-shek that the U.S. Army had received orders to desist from transporting Nationalist troops to fight a civil war. He proposed that Chiang Kai-shek concentrate his forces in order to consolidate his grip on North China, and only afterwards attempt to recover Northeast China.[8] Unable to obtain additional U.S. support, Nationalist forces halted their military advance in Northeast China.
At this time, the Nationalist ambassador to the United States, Wei Daoming, hinted to Chiang Kai-shek that he should coordinate his policy with that of the United States. Wei_s cable to Chiang said that Truman actually strongly supported the Nationalist government, and that his statement on China policy was drafted by the State Department largely for a domestic audience. Truman had already told Marshall that if the mediation effort failed, the U.S. would continue supporting the Nationalist government.[9] Obviously, Chiang Kai-shek chose to coordinate his policy with that of the United States. On December 22, a statement circulated by the Guomindang Central Propaganda Department analyzing Truman_s policy statement, presented a rather accurate reflection of the Nationalist viewpoint. The statement concluded that no fundamental change in U.S. China policy had occurred, and that the United States would not cut off its support and assistance to the Nationalist government. U.S. policy, however, would stop short of direct military intervention. The current change in U.S. policy stemmed from the need to deal with domestic politics. The Nationalist government should coordinate its own policy with the changes in U.S. policy. At the same time, it should implement political reforms, expand its political base, and improve its political image.[10] The Nationalist government subsequently undertook a series of measures including placing limits on military actions, the resumption of GMD-CCP negotiations, and improvement in Sino-Soviet relations, etc. All these measures were directly aimed at coordinating GMD policy with that of the United States.
(2) Communist Policy toward the United States
Nationalist policy aimed at dragging the United States into the Chinese civil war. As far as possible, the consistent policy of the CCP, which stood in an adversarial relationship with the United States at the end of the war, was to keep the U.S. from getting involved in the GMD-CCP conflict. By the end of the war, CCP leaders had concluded that the United States would assist Chiang Kai-shek in unleashing a civil war, but just how far the U.S. would go in this direction was not yet clear.[11] Thereafter, until U.S. troops landed in North China, the CCP Central Committee requested all Communist troops to exercise restraint. In Chongqing, Mao Zedong adopted a rather tolerant attitude toward Wedemeyer_s request for an investigation of incidents in which U.S. troops had been fired upon by Communist forces.[12] The Central Committee adopted a prudent attitude, in part because the Chongqing negotiations were going on, and strained relations with U.S. forces might harm the political struggle. In addition, the CCP needed to acquire a better understanding of U.S. policy.
In early October, CCP policy toward U.S. forces in China underwent a significant change. At this time, the Central Committee decided to use all means at its disposal to seize control of Northeast China. But the presence of U.S. forces that had landed in North China posed a serious threat to the Communists_ strategy of seizing the Northeast. Unless they resisted U.S. intervention, the Communist forces would squander the opportunity to enter Northeast China. The Central Committee ordered Communist forces at Yantai and the Qinhuandao-Shanhaiguan region to boldly risk military clashes, and stop U.S. military intrusions.[13] From late October to mid-November, the Central Committee repeatedly explained that _preparations must be made to resist the advance [of U.S. military invaders] by force of arms._ _Resolute resistance_ must be offered to direct U.S. military provocations, and captured U.S. military personnel should no longer be set free.[14] Simultaneously, the CCP began to mobilize public opinion to attack U.S. armed intervention in China_s civil war, and demand that U.S. forces be withdrawn from China.[15]
In mid-November, the Soviet Union reversed its policy of supporting the CCP_s attempt to seize control of Northeast China. Therefore, it became impossible for the Communists to gain unilateral control of the Northeast. Moscow again acknowledged Washington_s leading role in China while the U.S. expressed its intention of intervening in the GMD-CCP conflict. Obviously, U.S. influence in the Chinese political arena was growing. The CCP, therefore, had no choice but to reexamine its relations with the United States. In late November, the Central Committee suggested that, _At the present time when the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek is paramount....for a time (even if only formally), it may be possible to neutralize the United States , and to reduce our difficulties for a while or to some degree._[16] With this guidance, the CCP began to implement a policy of _neutralizing the United States._
It so happened that the policy of _neutralizing the United States_ was initially proposed precisely at the time when the Central Committee was changing its strategy toward North and Northeast China, and military clashes between U.S. and Communist forces were sporadically occurring along both sides of the North China rail lines. In these circumstances, the Central Committee indicated that the policy of _neutralizing the United States_ was merely _a tactic in the struggle againt Chiang Kai-shek, a policy of not provoking the United States in order to reduce its pretext [for intervening]._ But the Party intended to maintain a hard line regarding U.S. support of Chiang Kai-shek in the civil war and its intervention in GMD-CCP military conflicts even to the point of carrying out military resistance if necessary.[17]
At the beginning of December, CCP leaders noted the possibility of resuming negotiations. They believed, however, that until Soviet-American relations were stabilized and U.S. policy clarified, negotiations would be unable to settle any fundamental issues.[18] At this time, CCP leaders were more concerned about changes in U.S. policy. After all, it was the United States that could more effectively influence the Nationalist government_s policy. After publication of Secretary of State James F. Byrnes_s December 7 speech to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, CCP leaders immediately concluded that after Marshall arrived in China U.S. China policy might change for the better. Therefore, they resolved to adopt more flexible tactics so that the United States might entertain some hope of success in the GMD-CCP peace talks.[19]
On December 15, the same day that Truman announced his China policy, the Central Committee convened a meeting to discuss the current situation and U.S. policy toward China. The participants believed that there were limits to the U.S. policy of supporting Chiang Kai-shek and opposing the Communists, and that there were potentially useful aspects to the changes in U.S. China policy. Subsequently, a Central Committee spokesperson made a public declaration in which he welcomed Truman_s policy statement. The CCP representative in Chongqing told the American Embassy that he welcomed the Marshall mission.[20] On December 19, the Central Committee issued an intra-party directive concerning Truman_s statement and the Party_s policy toward the U.S. The Central Committee said that the changes in U.S. policy had positive implications with regard to the struggle the Communists were presently engaged in. Some of the changes were beneficial to the CCP. Therefore, the Party had to _prepare to make use of Truman_s statement._ The Central Committee directed all districts and Communist armed forces to improve their relations with U.S. military units and other American personnel. Moreover, they should allow American journalists to visit communist-controlled areas.[21] At the same time, the Central Committee publicly stated its conditional recognition of the right of U.S. troops to remain in North China.[22] At the beginning of January, after its attempt to solicit Soviet and British participation in the Marshall mediation effort failed, the CCP finally agreed to Marshall_s participation in the GMD-CCP negotiations, and accepted direct U.S. involvement in the National-Communist conflict.[23]
2. Changes in GMD & CCP Policy toward the U.S. during Marshall_s mission
It should be emphasized that the shifts in GMD and CCP policy toward the United States in late 1945 were not simply responses to changes in the Truman administration_s China policy. A more important reason was that after two months of military clashes, National and Communist military forces had reached a new equilibrium. Nationalist forces had assumed the strategic offensive, but were plagued with overextended lines. They suffered from a serious manpower shortage in North China. Moreover, every rail line in the region was blocked. In Northeast China the delay in the evacuation of Soviet troops appeared to benefit the Nationalist government, but a further improvement in Sino-Soviet relations was necessary before the Nationalists could contemplate a smooth takeover of the region. Communist troops in North China were clearly on the defensive. If the U.S. continued to transport Nationalist forces to North China, the Communist position would further deteriorate. Because of changes in Soviet policy, the Communists in Northeast China were unable to block the influx of Nationalist forces into the region. They were also unable to prevent them from taking over the large cities along the Changchun Railroad that were controlled by the Soviet Army.
It was precisely this evenly balanced situation that made both parties realize they had to revise their strategic plans. This was the background which made the changes in U.S. policy seem extremely important. In other words, the Guomindang and the CCP altered their policies toward the United States at this juncture because of their objective need to take advantage of Washington_s new policy. In military affairs as in diplomacy, the Nationalist government remained dependent upon American aid. Therefore, it sought to bring its strategic policy into line with the United States. The Chinese Communists were in a weak position. They had to employ strategems and skill to obstruct, reduce, or delay U.S. support and assistance to the Nationalist government. This is the critical background for understanding why it was that Marshall was able to achieve a certain degree of success in the initial period of his mediation.
(1) GMD & CCP Tactics toward Marshall in the Early Stage of Negotiations
The so-called first stage of Marshall_s mediation covers the period from early January to late February 1946 when the Nationalists and Communists signed a military reorganization agreement. At this time, both sides were rethinking their strategy, and adopted cooperative policies toward Marshall_s mediation. Both parties made rather large concessions with respect to certain important points of contention.
Marshall_s first meeting with Chiang Kai-shek after his arrival in China exposed the fundamental divergence between the two sides.[24] The first disagreement was over the question of a ceasefire. Marshall proposed an immediate and unconditional ceasefire, but Chiang Kai-shek wanted the U.S. to continue transporting Nationalist troops to North China. A second issue closely connected with the ceasefire was the question of which region, North China or Northeast China, should be considered the strategic center of gravity. In mid-November, Chiang Kai-shek had decided to concentrate his forces in order to seize the strategic strongpoint of North China first, and to take over Northeast China only after he had gained control of the railroads and lines of communication. Marshall_s position was exactly the opposite. He considered it necessary to recover the Northeast from Soviet control at the earliest possible moment, because it was the Nationalist government_s strategic center of gravity. The ceasefire in North China created the conditions for taking over the Northeast.
Whether willingly or under duress, Chiang Kai-shek eventually acceded to Marshall_s point of view. In the ceasefire negotiations soon afterwards, the Guomindang side repeatedly insisted that its army had the right to take over Chifeng in Rehe province as well as Duolun in Inner Mongolia. A dispute over this claim continued until the very day before the ceasefire agreement was signed. On January 9, Marshall took up the matter directly with Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang finally agreed to shelve this question for the time being. Consequently, the ceasefire agreement was signed on schedule.[25] A Nationalist attack on Rehe would have been a significant strategic move. Had they succeeded in encircling Chinese Communist forces in this region, the Nationalists could have severed the link between Communist forces in the Northeast and in North China. There can be no doubt that the Guomindang_s concession was substantial.
Thereafter, at the Political Consultative Conference (PCC) and military reorganization talks, Chiang Kai-shek continued to make concessions. Marshall did not take part directly in the PCC negotiations. At key points, he merely offered some draft agreements to the Guomindang side. Chiang Kai-shek_s assessment was that Marshall_s draft made proposals that _the Communist Party itself would not dare to propose....[proposals]that, moreover, courted national disaster._[26] Chiang Kai-shek was not exaggerating. The CCP_s reaction proved that Marshall_s draft indeed contained many provisions that were disadvantageous to the Nationalists. Nevertheless, Chiang Kai-shek signed the PCC resolution. The military reorganization negotiations were similar. Chiang Kai-shek believed that the signing of this agreement did _the greatest damage_ to the Nationalist government.[27]
In the ceasefire, PCC, and military reorganization negotiations, Chiang Kai-shek certainly made major concessions, but it would be wrong to suppose that he did so under American pressure without receiving something in return. In fact, Chiang Kai-shek and the United States coordinated their policies in a number of important respects.
From the moment of Marshall_s appointment as Special Ambassador, the Guomindang_s main tactic of getting a grip on him was their argument that the Nationalist-Communist conflict was a struggle in which the Nationalist government was resisting the Soviet Union_s Chinese proxy, namely, the CCP. [28] The success of this tactic may be seen in the extreme suspicion with which Marshall viewed Soviet intentions in the Northeast, and his resolve to transport Nationalist troops to the Northeast as quickly as possible to recover the region from the Soviets.[29] The ceasefire agreement signed on January 10 stipulated that once the ceasefire came into effect Nationalist troops could enter the Northeast and move about within the region.[30] This clause was the product of policy coordination between Marshall and Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang likewise traded concessions on other issues in return for U.S. promises to support and assist the Nationalist government_s takeover of the Northeast, including the transport of Nationalist forces to the region. The results of Marshall_s actions were obvious. When Nationalist forces in the Northeast were threatened, the United States felt obliged to provide assistance. One may even say that with the signing of the ceasefire agreement, the United States assumed special military obligations on behalf of the Nationalist government.
Initially, Chinese Communist leaders adopted a rather cautious attitude toward Marshall_s mediation effort. Even though they believed there were some positive aspects to the new U.S. China policy, their ingrained mistrust of the United Stated led them to believe there could be no fundamental change in U.S. support of Chiang Kai-shek, and that _there must be no illusions_ concerning this point.[31] In fact, CCP leaders initially could not make up their minds whether to allow Marshall to take part in the GMD-CCP negotiations. Unable to veto Marshall_s participation in the negotiations, they even toyed with the idea of simultaneously inviting Soviet and British representatives to join the negotiations as a check upon Marshall.[32]
It is very likely that Marshall_s performance in the GMD-CCP negotiations surprised CCP leaders. They assumed that any political concessions Marshall might make could not transcend the limits of the Five Point Agreement Hurley had signed during his 1944 visit to Yanan.[33] During their first meeting, Zhou Enlai, replying to Marshall_s emphasis on military unification, said that there must first be an unconditional ceasefire, next complete democratization of the government, and only then could one solve the question of military unification.[34] The subsequent negotiations demonstrated in fact that Marshall accepted Zhou Enlai_s perspective.
In the ceasefire negotiations, Marshall basically adhered to the principle of an unconditional ceasefire. With respect to the provisions concerning the Northeast, even though Marshall insisted that the Guomindang must be allowed to move troops in the region, the Communists really never firmly opposed this provision, and merely sought to attach certain limiting conditions. The outcome of the PCC negotiations was obviously much better than the Communist leaders_ initial expectations. Therefore, when Zhou Enlai returned to Chongqing from Yanan he told Marshall that the CCP Central Committee had decided to endorse the PCC agreement, and was willing to cooperate further with the United States. Mao Zedong issued a public statemt in which he said that _one could not ignore the meritorious service_ Marshall rendered in expediting the ceasefire and promoting peaceful democratization.[35] With respect to what from the CCP_s perspective was the most sensitive set of negotiations, namely those relating to military reorganization, even though the Communist leaders maintained constant vigilance toward U.S. intentions, they recognized that Marshall_s reorganization plan contained a subbstantial number of acceptable features.[36] In the end, the Chinese Communists signed the military reorganization agreement. In addition to the fact that the provisions of the agreement were acceptable to them, another reason they were willing to sign was their belief that Marshall_s attitude had been scrupulously fair.
Apart from there being substantial congruence between the CCP_s proposals and Marshall_s own point of view, the Communists were able to achieve a relatively favorable outcome from the negotiations because they employed appropriate tactics. Throughout the process, they loudly proclaimed their devotion to _peace_ and _democracy;_ they recognized Chiang Kai-shek_s leadership position and the position of the Guomindang as the leading party; they allowed Nationalist troops to enter the Northeast, and so forth. These measures produced a substantial impact upon Marshall_s attitude, and resulted in Chiang Kai-shek_s bitter complaint that Marshall _was being poisoned more every day by the Communist party._[37]
In sum, during the first phase of Marshall_s mediation, the GMD and the CCP both made rather significant concessions with respect to political and military issues. Almost all of these concessions were ones that Marshall strongly demanded they make. From another perspective, however, we may say that the GMD and CCP had no choice other than to utilize Marshall in pursuit of their own strategic objectives. Chiang Kai-shek traded temporary concessions in other areas for Marshall_s undertaking to transport Nationalist troops to the Northeast and provide support and assistance. The Communists allowed Nationalist troops to enter the Northeast in exchange for Marshall_s pressure on Chiang Kai-shek to implement an unconditional ceasefire and carry out political reforms. With respect to military reorganization, which both sides regarded as the most critical and sensitive issue, the Nationalists and the Communists both reserved their positions. They signed the agreement, but they procrastinated and adopted a wait-and-see attitude.
2. GMD and CCP Tactics toward Marshall concerning the Northeast Question
From March to June, the Northeast question became the focus of Marshall_s mediation. This was also the period in which critical changes occurred in GMD and CCP policies toward the United States.
One of Chiang Kai-shek_s tactics for solving the Northeast question was to drag the United States into the picture. After Marshall got to China, Chiang Kai-shek succeeded in taking advantage of U.S. suspicion regarding Soviet intentions in the Northeast. He actually persuaded Marshall to believe that the Northeast question was an issue between the Nationalist government and the Soviet Union, and that the CCP was merely acting like a Soviet puppet. Marshall clearly fell into the trap that Chiang Kai-shek set for him even though he was partly responsible for it himself. Marshall_s reports from this period show that he was almost entirely under Chiang Kai-shek_s influence. [38] Thus, while he urged the Communists to agree to the entry of Nationalist troops into the Northeast, he ignored Communist demands concerning resolution of the Northeast question. The classic example of this was that the draft plan he drew up on March 11 concerning the dispatch of small truce teams to the Northeast almost entirely reflected the Guomindang point of view. The agreement reached on the basis of this draft concerning deployment of small truce teams to end the clashes was naturally the first agreement to win Chiang Kai-shek_s commendation since the start of Marshall_s mediation.[39]
From the beginning of April, Chiang Kai-shek adopted an increasingly uncompromising position on the Northeast question. In a speech to the second session of the Fourth People_s Political Council on April 1, 1946, Chiag Kai-shek said that the Northeast question _is essentially a diplomatic issue._ The Chinese Communists must not take advantage of a diplomatic difficulty in order to coerce the government and promote themselves.[40] This was tantamount to a declaration of war against the the CCP. Simultaneously, Nationalist troops began to launch attacks against Communist forces in the Northeast. Around this time, Chiang Kai-shek put U.S. mediation on the back burner. Even after Marshall returned to China from the United States, Chiang Kai-shek still persisted in his old ways. He not only scorned Marshall_s proposals for a Northeast ceasefire, later in order to evade Marshall_s nagging he used the pretext of an inspection tour to get out of Nanjing and visit the Northeast.
Chiang Kai-shek_s unwillingness to make any further concessions to Marshall on the Northeast question expressed his belief that the situation had changed radically. First, beginning in February, Soviet-American relations began to deteriorate steadily. The U.S., Britain, and other countries were certain to implement a hard-line policy toward the Soviet Union. Second, the United States would definitely not permit the Soviet Union to control the Northeast. Therefore, Marshall could not allow the Chinese Communists to obstruct the Nationalist takeover of the Northeast. Third, because Chiang Kai-shek had adopted a cooperative posture during the first stage of Marshall_s mediation, he had succeeded in changing the Nationalist government_s image in the United States. Relations between the Chinese Nationalists and the U.S. were steadily improving. Marshall_s visit to Washington to report on his mission had a positive impact on the Nationalist government_s efforts to secure assistance. Fourth, Marshall now recognized that the CCP was pro-Soviet.[41] It was precisely this judgment that led Chiang Kai-shek to disregard Marshall_s strenuous opposition, and continue his northern campaign after Nationalist troops had occupied Changchun. When Chiang agreed to a ceasefire in the Northeast in mid-June, Marshall_s pressure upon him had something to with it, but the main reason was Chiang_s assessment that Nationalist troops had run out of steam.
Their own assessment of the Northeast situation led CCP leaders to agree to permit Nationalist troops to move into and around the Northeast during the ceasefire period. At this time, the Central Committee believed that since the U.S. and the Soviet Union had reached agreement at the Moscow Foreign Ministers Conference in December, Moscow was in no position to help the CCP control the Northeast. The CCP was unable on its own to prevent Nationalist troops from entering the Northeast and occupying the major cities and lines of communication. Therefore, the CCP sought to gain a legal position in the Northeast through negotiations. Considering Marshall_s role in the mediation, the Central Committee believed that as long as they could convince the Americans that they had no intention of monopolizing the occupation of the Northeast, Marshall would not object to a peaceful resolution.[42] After the clash in Yingkou, the Communists supported the despatch of truce teams to the Northeast. This shows that the Comunists believed U.S. involvement in the Northeast question would not necessarily be to their disadvantage. For a while, Communist leaders even believed that it was better to invite Marshall to take part in mediation of the Northeast question than to invite a Soviet representative, because his attitude toward the Chinese Communists _was fair and impartial._[43]
Once negotiations over the Northeast began, for a certain period the Central Committee continued to view Marshall_s mediation as impartial and, therefore, acceptable. In March the Communists still believed in the possibility of a peaceful resolution of the Northeast question.[44] Subsequently, however, Communist leaders began to think that Marshall_s position on the Northeast question had drawn very close to that of Chiang Kai-shek, and that the United States wanted to help the Nationalist government recover the Changchun railroad. Meanwhile, the Communists increasingly came to consider the Marshall mediation as of marginal importance.
Two important factors caused the Chinese Communists to devalue the importance of the American mediation effort. First, beginning in mid-March, the Soviet Union resumed actively supporting Chinese Communist efforts to seize control of the large cities along the Changchun railroad and to the north of it.[46] Second, Mao Zedong significantly altered his assessment of the international situation. Just when Chiang Kai-shek decided that a serious Soviet-American confrontation was in the offing, and he _had the feeling that a Third World War was approaching,_ Mao Zedong concluded that Soviet-American compromise was the main trend.[47] The Soviet Union_s weight in CCP policy making was increasing, and Mao judged that sooner or later the U.S. would come to terms with the Soviet Union on these two elements. So Marshall_s mediation declined precipitously as a factor in CCP policymaking. The Communists no longer welcomed Marshall_s mediation, and from this time on it was merely a matter of time before the Communists no longer accepted Marshall_s mediation. This was the most significant latent change in CCP policy toward the United States in this period.
3. Dragging Things Out: The Final Chapter
In the first week of June, not long after the announcement of the Northeast ceasefire, Nationalist forces launched a large-scale offensive against Communist forces in Central China. A full-scale civil war had finally erupted. From that moment until Marshall_s departure from China, the GMD and the CCP both adopted tactics of procrastination with respect to Marshall_s mediation. The main reason why Marshall lingered in China for more than six months, apart from his almost unbelievable personal patience, was that both parties still thought they could derive some benefit from his presence, and wanted to avoid shouldering the responsibility for bringing about the failure of the American mediation effort.
During this period, Chiang Kai-shek was unwilling to offend Marshall lest he provoke new problems in receiving U.S. aid, but Chiang was also determined not to allow Marshall_s mediation to get in the way of the Guomindang_s military actions. Chiang agreed to a ceasefire in the Northeast in order to concentrate his forces in China Proper to deal with the Chinese Communists, but in return he requested that Marshall apply pressure on the CCP.[48] In the rather long period that followed, Marshall slipped into the role of messenger boy, constantly transmitting Chiang Kai-shek_s orders to the Chinese Communists. There were two main reasons why Chiang Kai-shek handled Marshall_s mediation in this fashion.
First was his belief that the U.S. policy of supporting the Nationalist government was already set. All he had to do was to fly the anti-Soviet and anti-communist banners and talk of unity, and in the end the United States would support and assist him. During the Northeast ceasefire, the Truman administration proposed a _Military Advisor and Assistance Bill_ to Congress, and decided to extend the term of the Chinese Lend-Lease program. At this same time, Washington and Nanjing intensified their negotiations and signed a Treaty of Commerce in November 1946. Increasing U.S. support for the Nationalist government and the growing intimacy between the two countries weakened Marshall_s position. Chiang Kai-shek was no longer able to take Marshall_s mediation seriously anymore. In step with the increase in U.S. assistance, Marshall himself became increasingly partial to the Nationalist side in the course of his mediation. This convinced Chiang Kai-shek that Marshall was no longer well-disposed toward the Chinese Communists, and that he would eventually lean entirely to the Nationalist side. Therefore, Chiang treated most of Marshall_s requests in a perfunctory fashion, only pretending to do otherwise when he had no alternative. The results were just what Chiang expected. By the time Marshall left China, his impressions of Chiang Kai-shek had taken a turn for the better.[49]
At this time, CCP policy toward the United States underwent a big change. After full-scale civil war erupted, the CCP resolved upon a course of armed resistance to the Nationalist government. In line with this strategy, CCP policy toward the United States changed from one of seeking cooperation with the U.S. to one of trying to eliminate U.S. intervention, compel U.S. forces to withdraw from China, and exclude the possibility of U.S. military intervention. The CCP wanted to obstruct, reduce, and delay U.S. assistance to the Nationalist government. There were two main reasons why the Communists were still willing to deal with Marshall. First was to make use of Marshall_s mediation in order to gain time for military preparations. Second was to place responsibility for the civil war and for the failure of Marshall_s mediation on the United States and Chiang Kai-shek, and deprive the United States of a pretext for intervention.[50]
Guomindang and CCP tactics demonstrated in a particularly striking fashion the very real limits upon the power of Marshall, that is to say of the United States, to control the situation in China. And these limits were becoming increasingly severe. Rather than seeing the Marshall mediation as an American effort to gain control of the situation in China, it would be more accurate to see it as a game game in which the Guomindang and the Communists both played a foreign card.
Conclusion
Surveying the adjustments and changes in GMD and CCP policies toward the United States over a period of just more than a year, we may come to the following set of tentative conclusions.
First, both the Guomindang and the Communists achieved some success in their policies toward the United States. The goal of Guomindang policy was to get U.S. support and assistance in their struggle against the Communists. Over the course of Marshall_s mediation, Chiang Kai-shek racked his brains trying to figure out how to lure Marshall step by step into deeper water. When China erupted in full-scale civil war, the United States decided tafter all o provide assistance to the Nationalist government, abandoning the pretense of attaching any conditions to such assistance. Once the United States made this decision, it was no longer able to extricate itself from the Chinese civil war.
The goals of CCP policy toward the United States underwent a somewhat more tortuous series of changes. The initial objective was to use American mediation in order to prevent the Guomindang from launching a civil war and to promote democratic reforms in China. After the outbreak of full-scale civil war in June, the Communists were on guard against the possibility of direct U.S. military intervention and tried to stop the United States from assisting the Nationalist government. The Chinese Communists enjoyed at least partial success during these two stages even though this was not entirely the result of CCP policy itself. After the outbreak of full-scale civil war, CCP gains were not limited to using Marshall_s mediation to defer the delivery of U.S. aid to the Nationalist government. More important was the conclusion that Communist leaders reached from the Marshall mission. This was that the American capacity as well as desire to intervene in China was relatively limited, and that the United Stated could not get directly involved militarily. This judgment had the utmost significance in terms of the Communist leaders_ subsequent strategic decision-making.
Second, Guomindang and CCP policy toward the United States was the product of many influences as well as painstaking deliberation. It was far from being a simple reaction to U.S. policy. Generally speaking, in addition to the influence of U.S. policy and actions, the policies of the Guomindang and the CCP toward the United States were the result of several factors. First was the assessment of the international situation by the leaders of both parties, and second was their assessment of the state of Soviet-American relations. It was also the result of their assessment of the relative strength of the two parties and the developing trends in the struggle between them.
Connected to these two conclusions is a third one. Judging from the formulation, implementation, and changes in Guomindang and CCP policy toward the United States, one may say that the U.S. influence upon the political situation in postwar China was considerable. However, it was also relatively limited. From the moment of U.S. intervention in the GMD-CCP struggle, both parties constantly utilized the U.S. in accordance with their own needs. At the time Marshall abandoned his mediation, he had been unable to avert the outbreak of civil war in China. Nor was he able to secure the goodwill of the Guomindang or the CCP. When Chiang Kai-shek offered a few words of praise to him on parting, it was only because Chiang feared offending the U.S. government. The CCP directly attacked him, charging that he and the U.S. government he represented had been perpetrating a fraud. What the failure of the Marshall mediation really represented was the failure of U.S. intervention in Chinese internal affairs at the end of the 1940s. And the fundamental reason for this failure was that the United States was trying to get involved in things that from the very beginning it had no business getting involved in at all.
ENDNOTES
[1] Major works by Chinese scholars on this subject include the following.
Niu Jun, Cong Xiaerli dao Maxier: Meiguo tiaochu guo-gong maodun shimo [Fuzhou: Renmin chubanshe, 1989.]; Niu Jun, Cong Yanan zou xiang shijie:Zhong guo gongchandang duiwai guanxi de qiyuan (1935-1949) [Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1992 {An English translation of this book is being prepared for publication in the United States.} Rao Geping, Jiang Jieshi, Guomindang Zhengfu yu Meiguo ; He Di, FILL IN ENGLISH VERSION OFHIS ESSAY.
[2] Xiang Liling, Zhuanzhe de I nian: Xiaerli shi Hua yu Meiguo dui Hua zhengce (Chongqing, Chongqing chubanshe, 1988), pp. 175-176. Zi Zhongyun, Meiguo dui Hua zhengce di yuanqi he fazhan (Chongqing: Chongqing renmin chubanshe, 1989), pp. 43-44. _Oral Statement by President Truman to Dr. T.V. Soong Concerning Assistance to China,_ September 14, 1945, The China White Paper August 1949 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967, Vol. II, p. 939. Herbert Feis, The China Tangle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), Chapter 32.
[3] Regarding relations between the Soviet army in Northeast China and the Chinese Communist forces, see Niu Jun, _Zhanhou chuqi Mei-Su Guo-Gong zai Zhongguo dongbei de douzheng,_ Jindai shi yanjiu, No. 1, 1987.
[4] Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! [ ]; Zhong-Mei Guanxi ziliao huibian Vol. 1 (Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1957), pp. 191-192.
[5] _Statement by President Truman on United States Policy toward China._ December 15, 1945, The China White Paper , pp. 607-609.
[6] Du Jianshi, _Jiang bang jie shou PingJin Jingguo,_ Zhengxiewenshi ziliao weiyuanhui ed., Wenshi ziliao xuanji , No. 55.
[7] Chiang Kai-shek, Soviet Russia in China ( ), p.
[8] Wedemeyer, p. ; Feis, pp. 385-386, 416-417.
[9] _Zhu Mei dashi Wei Daoming cheng Jiang zhuxi gao Mei zongtongcu Maxier jiangjun su lai Huadian,_November 29, 1945; _Zhu Mei dash Wei Daoming cheng Jiang zhuxi gao Mei zongtong zhishi Maxier teshi tiaoting fangzhen dian deng shi dian,_ December 18, 1945. See, Zhongguo Guomindang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui ed., Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chu bian- dui Ri zhanzheng shiqi , No. 7 Zhanhou Zhongguo , III:1, 42, p. 61.
[10] _Guomindang dui Dulu(men) de dui Hua zhengce shengming zhi fenxi,_ Guomindang zhongyang zhixing weiyuanhui xuanchuanbu, December 23, 1945, in CCP History Section Materials Room, People_s University, # 5/6.0453.2100.
[11] Mao Zedong, _The Situation and Our Policy after the Victory of the War of Resistance,_ (August 13, 1945) Selected Works , Vol. 4 , pp.
[12] _Weideman yu Mao Zedong tanhua yaodian beiwanglu,_ August 8, 1945; _Mei jun denglu wo ying bimian chongtu,_ September 1, 1945; _Shifang Mei ren,_ September 1, 1945; _Shandong fenju guanyu duifu Mei jun denglu de ge xiang zhunbei gongzuo ji duiwai zhengce fangmian de wenti gei ge qu de zhishi,_ September 2, 1945.[13] _Zhongyang guanyu caiqu qiangying taidu jujue Mei jun denglu de zhishi,_ October 4, 1945; _Zhongyang guanyu jianjue fandui Mei jun qiangxiu tielu wenti gei Nie, Xiao,Chan de zhishi,_ October 25, 1945; _Junwei guanyu jianjue dikang Mei jun de jingong gei Li, Chande zhishi,_ November 7, 1945.
[14] _Zhongyang guanyu yingfu Huabei Mei jun huodong gei ge ju ge qu dangwei de zhishi,_ October 29, 1945.
[15] _Zhongyang xuanchuan bu guanyu zhankai jielu Mei-Jiang jingong jiefang qu de xuanchuan gongshi zhi ge di dian,_ November 4, 1945. Zhongyang dangan guan ed., Zhong gong zhongyang wenjian xuanji , No. 15, (Zhong gong zhongyang dangxiao chuban she, 1991), pp. 406-407.
[16] _Zhongyang guanyu dui Mei-Jiang douzheng celue de zhishi,_ November 28, 1945, Zhong gong zhongyang wenjian xuanji , No. 15, pp. 455-456.
[17] Ibid. ; Zhou Enlai, _Guanyu Guo-Gong tanpan,_ December 5, 1945, Zhonggung zhongyang wenxian yanjiu shi ji Zhonggong Nanjing shi weiyuanhui, ed. Zhou Enlai yu 1946 nian tanpan wenxuan (Beijing: Zhongyangwenxian chuban she, 1996), pp. 5-6.
[18] _Zhongyang guanyu yu Guomindang tanpan de celue gei Dong Biwu, Wang Rofei de zhishi,_ December 5, 1945.
[19] _Zhongyang guanyu muqian xingshi ji tanpan wenti zhi Dong Biwu, Wang Rofei tongzhi dian._ December 9, 1945; Zhongyang tongzhan bu he zhongyang dangan guan ed., Zhong gong zhongyang jiefang zhanzheng shiqi tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian (Dangan chuban she, 1988), p. 34.
[20] Foreign Relations of the United States , 1945, Vol. 7, The Far East: China , p. 794.
[21] _Zhongyang guanyu Meiguo dui Hua zhengce biandong he wo dang duice de zhishi,_ December 19, 1945, Zhonggong wenjian xuanji , No. 15, pp. 494-495.
[22] Jiefang Ribao , December 18, 1945.
[23] _Zhongyang guanyu tingzhan, shouxiang, huifu jiaotong deng wenti gei Chongqing daibiao tuan de zhishi,_ January 2, 1946; _Zhongyang guanyu tiyi Yingguo Sulian canjia Guo-Gong tanpan wenti de zhishi,_ January 3, 1946.
[24] FRUS, 1945, Vol. 7 The Far East:China, pp. 795-797.
[25] Qin Xiaoyi ed., Zongtong Jiang Gong da shichang bian chugao , Vol. 6 (Taibei:Zhongyang wenwu gongying she, 1988), Part 1, p. 2760. General Marshall_s Report on His Mission to China (CHECK TITLE, FILL IN INFO]
[26] Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chu bian - dui Ri kangzhan shiqi , No. 7 Zhanhou Zhongguo Vol.3, part 1, p. 71.
[27] Ibid. Jiang zongtong milu , No. 14, p. 37.
[28] _ZhuMei dashi Wei Daoming cheng Jiang zhuxi gao yu Maxier teshi yutan yaodian dian,_ December 6, 1945, in op. cit. Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian , pp. 46-47; FRUS, 1945, Vol. 7, The Far East: China , pp. 795-797.
[29] FRUS, 1945, Vol. 7 The Far East: China , p. 813; FRUS, 1946, Vol. 9, The Far East: China , pp. 142-143.
[30] _Zhengfu daibiao yu Zhong gong daibiao tuan guanyu tingzhi guonei junshi chongtu ji huifu jiaotong de mingling yu shengming,_ January 10, 1946, Meng Guanghan et al. eds., Zhengzhi xieshang huiyi jishi , Vol. 2 (Chongqing: Chongqing chuban she, 1989), pp. 847-848.
[31] _Zhongyang guanyu Meiguo dui Hua zhengce biandong he wo dang duice de zhishi,_ December 19, 1945.
[32] _Huanying wailai de youyi xiezhu, xiwang mengguo bu ganshe Zhongguo neizheng,_ January 1, 1946. Zhou Enlai 1946 nian tanpan wenxuan , p. 28. _Zhongyang guanyu tiyi Yingguo Sulian canjia Guo-Gong tanpan wenti de zhishi,_ January 3, 1946.
[33] Op. cit. Zhou Enlai, _Guanyu Guo-Gong tanpan,_ December 5, 1945.
[34] _Huanying Maxierh lai Hua cujin Zhongguo heping,_ December 23, 1945, Zhou Enlai 1946 nian tanpan wenxuan , pp. 22-24.
[35] Zhou Enlai, _Zhong gong yuan zai gongzheng de jichu shang tong Meiguo he Guomindang jixu hezuo,_ January 31, 1946, Zhou Enlai 1946 nian tanpan wenxuan , pp. 92-94; _Mao Zedong shengzan zhengxie chengjiu,_ February 13, 1946, Xinhua Ribao , Chongqing.
[36] _Zhongyang guanyu yu Guomindang tanpan jundui zhengbian de fangzhen de zhishi,_ February 8, 1946.
[37] Op cit., Jiang zongtong milu , Vol. 14, p. 37.
[38] FRUS, 1946, Vol. 9, The Far East: China, pp. 427-429.
[39] _Maxier tichu guanyujunshi tiaochu zhixing bu paiqian tingzhan xiaozu qu dongbei de zhiling caoan,_ March 11, 1946, Zhengzhi xieshang huiyi jishi , Part 2, p. 1111; _Juntiaobu zhi dongbei zhixing xiaozu Mei fang daibiao miling,_ March 1946, see Zhonghua minguo zhongyao shiliao chubian , Vol. 7 Zhanhou Zhongguo,_ III, Part 1,p. 95; _Zongtong Jiang Gong da shi changbian chugao, Vol. 6, Part 1, p. 2836.
[40] See Zhongyang Ribao , April 4, 1946 (Chongqing).
[41] _Zongtong Jiang Gong da shi changbian,_ Vol. 6, part 1, pp. 2817, 2842; _Jiang zongtong milu,_ Vol. 14, pp. 38, 46, 49, 55; _Zhu Mei dashi Wei Daoming cheng Jiangzhuxi gao Maxier teshi fan Mei baogao guandian deng shi dian,_ March 21, 1946; _Shang Zhen canjunzhang cheng Jiang zhuxi gaowu Li Hai [Leahy] shangjiang Nimizi [Nimitz] shangjiang qingxing dian,_ March 23, 1946; _Shang Zhen canjunzhangcheng Jiang zhuxi gao jinjian Tulumen zongtong qingxing dian,_ April 1, 1946; _Shang Zhen junzhang cheng Jiang zhuxi gao yu Maxier teshi wu tan qingxing dian,_ April 4, 1946. For all of the preceding, see Zhonghua minguozhongyao shiliao chubian Vol 7 Zhanhou Zhongguo , III, Part 1, pp. 100-101, 102-103, 107-108.
[42] _Zhongyang guanyu tingzhan hou wo dang dui Manzhou de zhengce wenti gei dongbei ju de zhishi,_ January 11, 1946; _Zhongyang guanyu jiejue dongbei wenti de fangzhen gei Zhong gong zhu Chongqing tanpan daibiao tuan de zhishi,_January 21, 1946; _Zhongyang guanyu muqian dongbei gongzuo de fangzhen wenti gei dongbei ju de zhishi,_ January 26, 1946. For the preceding, see Zhong gong zhongyang wenjian xuanji , Vol. 16, pp. 20-21, 55-60.
[43] _Zhong gong guanyu dongbei tingzhan tanpan qingkuang zhi dongbei ju dian,_ February 12, 1946; _Ying gong zhongyang jiefang zhanzheng shiqi tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian,_ pp. 77-79.
[44] _Zhongyangguanyu buyao zhudong jingong Shenyang wenti gei Dongbei ju de zhishi,_ March 13, 1946.
[45] _Mei qitu zhu Jiang jieshou Changxhun lu, fei da bu zu yi sha qi weifeng,_ April 8, 1946; _Dui Jiang Jieshi liang mian zofa de fenxi he women de duice,_ April 16, 1946; _Mei-Jiang zai Dongbei wenti shang juli yi bu xiangyuan,_ May 13, 1946; in Zhou Enlai 1946 nian tanpan wenxuan , pp. 229-230, 247-249, 327-328.
[46] See, Niu Jun, Cong Yanan zou xiang shijie , pp. 234-235.
[47] Mao Zedong, Selected Works , Vol. 4, pp. ; Jiang zongtong milu , Vol. 14, p. 49.
[48] Zongtong Jiang Gong da shi changbian chugao , Vol. 6, Part 1, p. 2943.
[49] Ibid., pp. 2969-2971, 2983, 3074.
[50] _Zhongyang guanyu dongyuan ge qun tuanti yaoqiu Meiguo gaibian dui Hua fandong zhengce de zhishi,_ June 24, 1946; _Zhongyang guanyu fabiao jinian _qi qi_ xuanyan hou dui Meiguo jy Guomindang douzheng wenti de zhishi,_ July 6, 1946; _Zhongyang xuanchuanbu guanyu dui Mei xuanchuan zhong zhengce wenti de zhishi,_ July 21, 1946; _Zhongyang guanyu Maxier, Situleideng fabiao gongbao hou wo dang duice wenti gei Zhou Enlai de zhishi,_ August 12, 1946; _Zhongyang guanyu Mei fang chexiao junshi tiaochu zhixingbu de zhishi,_ January 30, 1947 in Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji , Vol. 16, pp. 216-217, 230-231, 259-260, 272-273, 397-398. _Jielu Jiang Jiesh tuo zhong da da he Meiguo bian tan bian yuan Jiang de yinmou,_ August 27, 1946 in Zhou Enlai 1946 nian tanpan wenxuan , pp. 628-629.
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